Renewable fuel standards, low carbon fuel standards, and ethanol subsidies are popular policies to incentivize ethanol production and reduce emissions from transportation. Compared to carbon trading, these policies lead to large shifts in agricultural activity and unexpected social costs. We simulate the 2022 Federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and find that energy crop production increases by 39 million acres. Landuse costs from erosion and habitat loss are between $277 and $693 million. A low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) and ethanol subsidies have similar effects while costs under an equivalent cap and trade (CAT) system are essentially zero. In addition, the alternatives to CAT magnify errors in assigning emissions rates to fuels and can over or under-incentivize innovation. These results highlight the potential negative effects of the RFS, LCFS and subsidies, effects that would be less severe under a CAT policy.
Introduction
Policy makers have pursued a variety of policies to lower carbon emissions from transportation fuels. A number of studies have shown that renewable fuel standards (RFS) or mandates, low carbon fuel standards (LCFS) and direct subsidies are inefficient instruments for achieving emissions reductions relative to cap and trade (CAT) or carbon pricing (Cui et al., 2011; de Gorter and Just, 2010; Holland, Hughes, and Knittel, 2009; Holland et al., 2013; Lapan and Moschini, 2012; Khanna, Ando, and Taheripour, 2008; Chen et al., 2011) . We show these policies may also differ from CAT along other important dimensions. Specifically, the alternatives to CAT dramatically increase agricultural production, land-use, and social costs due to erosion and habitat loss. They provide incentives for innovation in ethanol production that are too small or too large. They are also much more sensitive to uncertainty in the emissions rates of fuels increasing the likelihood of uncontrolled emissions. These results highlight the potential negative effects of current transportation sector carbon policies, effects that would be less severe under a CAT policy.
In this paper we simulate long-run equilibrium outcomes under two existing policies: ethanol subsidies and the 2022 US RFS. We also simulate two policies currently under consideration: a national LCFS and a CAT system. The LCFS and CAT policies are calibrated to achieve the same overall reduction in carbon emissions as the RFS. Our simulations exploit detailed data on agricultural production and waste biomass resources. We construct county-level supply curves for corn ethanol and six cellulosic ethanol fuels by combining the resource data with engineering models for ethanol production. Based on these relationships we estimate emissions, energy crop and biomass consumption, land-use, and related externalities under each policy.
Our results are quite surprising. Under the RFS, LCFS, and CAT, carbon emissions fall by 10.2 percent. Under subsidies emissions fall by 6.9 percent. 1 Annual ethanol production increases substantially under the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies by 14.9 to 18.5 billion gasoline gallon equivalents (gge), relative to our business as usual scenario. Under CAT, the increase is much more modest at approximately 3.8 billion gge. Because some ethanol is produced from energy crops, there are also large shifts in agricultural activity. Under the RFS, LCFS and subsidies, between 27.6 and 39.0 million additional acres of land are used for energy crop production, or between 6 and 9 percent of existing US crop land. Under CAT, only 1.2 million additional acres are required.
These large shifts in agricultural activity create social costs from habitat loss and increased erosion. We estimate land-use related costs between $147 million and $693 million for the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies. Under CAT, these costs are essentially zero. Large increases in ethanol production combined with uncertainty in the emissions rates of different fuels can also lead to "uncontrolled" emissions above or below the level intended by policy makers. 2 Because the alternatives to CAT require more ethanol production, these policies are much more sensitive to errors in assigning emissions intensities. For example, if the emissions rate for corn ethanol is 10 percentage points higher than expected, we estimate between $174 million and $308 in damages from uncontrolled emissions under the RFS, LCFS or subsidies. Under CAT, damages from uncontrolled emissions are only $30 million.
Because cellulosic or "second-generation" ethanol fuels are not yet widely produced, policy makers may wish to provide incentives for innovation in ethanol technologies. We estimate the incentives to develop cellulosic ethanol, reduce costs and lower fuel emission intensities across the different policies. We consider firm's marginal private incentives to innovate and gains from public R&D. 3 In general, innovation lowers energy prices and average abatement costs across policies. 4 The alternatives to CAT can provide marginal private incentives for innovation that are too large. For example, incentives for reducing fuel emissions by one gram of carbon dioxide per gasoline gallon equivalent are 4 to 36 times larger under the LCFS than under CAT. However, when innovation is publicly provided, gains to producers vary substantially across policies and can be larger or smaller than social benefits from innovation. In some cases, innovation decreases producer surplus. Under the LCFS, cellulosic ethanol producers gain over $20 billion per year, and corn ethanol producers lose over $85 billion per year with the development of cellulosic ethanol. The social benefits from innovation are $2.6 billion. On the other hand, innovation that reduces cellulosic ethanol carbon emissions rates by 10 percentage points decreases cellulosic producer surplus by $3.9 billion per year under the LCFS. The social benefits from innovation are $1.4 billion per year. Overall, we find incentives for innovation can be too large or too small.
Our work contributes to a large literature on the agricultural and land use impacts of US carbon and biofuel policies. Recent studies focus primarily on the US RFS and combinations of the RFS with ethanol subsidies or carbon taxes (Bento, Klotz, and Landry, 2012; Chakravorty et al., 2013; Keeney and Hertel, 2009; Chen et al., 2011) . Consistent with our results, these studies find large increases in corn and total agricultural acreage under the RFS. Shifts in farming can lead to large food price effects, on the order of 17 to 20 percent (Chakravorty et al., 2013; Roberts and Schlenker, 2013) . 5 A major contribution of our work is to contrast these effects across the RFS and alternate policies that achieve the same environmental goal. In addition, we estimate non-carbon costs related to land-use changes across policies.
A second literature estimates indirect land use effects of US biofuel policies. Dumortier et al. (2011) and Keeney and Hertel (2009) show that the magnitudes of these effects are highly uncertain and depend on modelers' assumptions about yields, trade responses and the availability of idle cropland. Our analysis of uncontrolled emissions suggests carbon policies which rely more heavily on ethanol production magnify the effects of these uncertainties.
Finally, while a large theoretical literate has explored incentives for innovation, few studies have quantified gains from innovation across different policies. 6 We estimate these effects for CAT, the LCFS and ethanol subsidies. Much of the literature has focused on abatement costs (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung, Krutilla, and Boyd, 1996; Fischer, Parry, and Pizer, 2003) . We also consider effects in the output market and estimate both the total gains from innovation and the private gains to producers. 7 This distinction is important as the private gains to cellulosic ethanol producers under the LCFS and subsidies are much larger than the social benefits from innovation.
Overall, we show that transportation sector carbon policies vary along a number of important dimensions. The alternatives to CAT create different fuel mixes, land use patterns, and incentives for innovation. These differences can increase social costs substantially. This highlights the important trade-offs faced by policy makers in evaluating approaches for reducing carbon emissions in transportation. 6 Examples of the later include Johnstone, Haščič, and Popp (2010) who study patent applications under various policies and Jaffe and Stavins (1995) who study the effect of taxes, standards and subsidies on the adoption of energy efficient building technologies. 7 Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung, Krutilla, and Boyd (1996) , argue that market based mechanisms provide greater incentives for innovation compared to command and control policies. Emissions taxes and auctioned permits provide greater incentives than free permits when innovators appropriate a fixed fraction of gains. However, in a competitive setting Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003) show that the relative welfare ranking of market based instruments depends on innovation spillovers, costs and environmental benefits. Allowing for imperfect competition in permit and output markets, Montero (2002) shows that incentives for innovation can be greater under standards than under market based policies.
Biofuel policies
We begin by illustrating the incentives created by each biofuel policy. We consider four alternatives, renewable fuel standards (RFS), low carbon fuel standards (LCFS), a carbon cap and trade system (CAT), and ethanol subsidies (SUBS). Our modeling approach is similar to Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) and Holland et al. (2013) . A single, representative, price taking firm produces quantities q 1 , q 2 . . . q n−1 of different ethanol fuels and q n gallons of gasoline. 8 Let mc i (q i ) be the marginal cost of producing fuel i with mc i (q i ) ≥ 0 and with carbon emissions rate β i . We assume the fuels are perfect substitutes, once adjusted for volumetric energy content, such that all fuel trades at a common price p. The firm maximizes profit subject to the constraints or incentives created by each policy.
Carbon emissions rates of biofuels are notoriously difficult to measure. Emissions must be determined on a life-cycle basis, which requires calculating a number of difficult parameters such as indirect land use effects. Nonetheless, for a carbon policy, regulators must determine how much carbon is emitted from each fuel. This determination, which may be based on politics as much as science, will determine the resulting equilibrium under each policy. The β i 's in this section are the "regulated" carbon emissions rates rather than the "true" carbon emissions rates. Ideally, the regulated and true carbon emissions rates would be the same. Below we analyze differences between the regulated and true carbon emissions rates.
Renewable fuel standard
The US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was first created under the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It was subsequently updated under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (U.S. Congress, 2007) . The RFS sets volumetric targets for ethanol production in three categories, cellulosic (cell), advanced (adv) and total (tot) renewable fuels. The categories roughly capture the carbon emissions of each fuel type (β cell < β adv < β tot ). The categories are additive such that cellulosic production counts towards both the advanced and total renewable fuel requirements and advanced renewable fuels count towards the total requirement. In 2022, the RFS requires 36 billion gallons (24 billion gge) per year of renewable fuel including 21 billion and 16 billion gallons of advanced and cellulosic fuels.
The RFS is implemented using ratios that translate the volumetric targets into proportional targets based on projected gasoline demand. Specifically, the RFS ratio σ RF Sj = q j qn requires σ RF Sj gallons of ethanol of type j for every gallon of gasoline produced. To allow ethanol production by the least cost firms, tradable Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) are created with the production of each type of ethanol and used by firms to demonstrate compliance. Because firms can sell RINs, they act as a subsidy to ethanol production. The first-order conditions for ethanol are:
where, p RIN j is the price of a RIN of type j with j ∈ {cell, adv, tot}. The RFS also acts as an implicit tax on gasoline because producing additional gasoline increases the ethanol (RIN) procurement obligation. The first-order condition for gasoline production is:
where the σ terms reflect the fact that additional gasoline production raises the ethanol procurement obligation and that the three ethanol categories are additive. For example, an additional gallon of gasoline requires σ cell additional gges of cellulosic ethanol or cellulosic RINs which costs p RIN cell σ cell . For advanced ethanol, cellulosic fuel is counted toward the obligation such that the additional cost for advanced ethanol is p RIN adv (σ adv − σ cell ). Similarly for the total requirement, the additional cost taking into account advanced fuel is p RIN tot (σ tot − σ adv ). For more details see Holland et al. (2013) .
Low carbon fuel standard
Low carbon fuel standards (LCFSs) set average carbon intensity requirements for transportation fuels. This approach has been influential at both the state and federal levels. In 2009, California adopted an LCFS requiring the state reduce the average carbon intensity of transportation fuel 10 percent by 2020 (State of California, 2010). Oregon has adopted a policy similar to the California LCFS. Under an LCFS, a firm's quantity weighted average emissions intensity for transportation fuel may not exceed the standard σ LCF S . Using the notation above, the LCFS constraint is:
Firms adjust total fuel output and the relative quantities of fuel produced to comply with the regulation. The first-order condition for fuel i is:
where λ LCF S is the shadow value of the LCFS constraint. Notice that for high carbon fuels, β i > σ LCF S , the last term in equation 4 is positive and the policy acts like an implicit tax on production. For low carbon fuels, β i < σ LCF S , the policy acts like an implicit subsidy. Note that like the RFS, an LCFS creates strong incentives for fuel substitution via implicit subsidies for lower carbon fuels. 12
Carbon trading
In 2009 the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "American Clean Energy and Security Act," H.R. 2454 otherwise known as the "Waxman-Markey" bill. This legislation, though never approved by the Senate, would have established a broad national carbon trading system including transportation fuels. 13
Under a transportation sector carbon trading system, total emissions summed over all fuels produced must not exceed the cap (σ CAT ), formally:
11 For example see http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=a4499663-9559-b897-f40b-7b3ba9c94fcd, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama New Energy 0804.pdf and http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript-FC-HR-2454-ACES-2009-5-18.pdf 12 Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) investigate firm incentives under an LCFS and show that, under very general conditions, an LCFS cannot achieve the efficient allocation of emissions and energy production.
13 Holland et al. (2013) investigate the political economy of transportation sector carbon policy as a possible explanation of why H.R. 2454 was unsuccessful.
The first-order conditions of the firm's profit maximization problem are:
where λ CAT is the shadow price of the carbon constraint or equivalently, the price of a carbon permit. Note that each carbon-emitting fuel is taxed in proportion to its carbon emissions. While CAT does provide incentives for substitution by taxing dirtier fuels more, it also provides a greater incentive for reducing fuel consumption due to higher fuel prices. 14 Because producer prices for all fuel increase, equilibrium prices under CAT are larger compared with policies that implicitly or explicitly subsidize ethanol.
Ethanol subsidies
There is a long history of direct subsidies for ethanol production in the US. Until December 2011, ethanol producers received a federal tax credit of 45 cents per gallon under the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC). 15 In addition, small volume producers with less than 60 million gallon capacity also qualify for the Small Ethanol Producer Tax Credit of 10 cents per gallon. For cellulosic ethanol, the 2008 farm bill established a tax credit of 101 cents per gallon, less any applicable VEETC credit. Finally, a number of states provide their own ethanol subsidies or excise tax exemptions. 16
Modeling ethanol subsidies is straightforward. Under the assumptions above, a profit maximizing firm produces until marginal cost, less the subsidy s i , equals the market clearing price. The firm's first-order conditions for ethanol production are:
for each ethanol fuel i. For gasoline, the firm produces until marginal cost equals price. Similar to the RFS and LCFS, direct subsidies provide a large incentive for fuel substitution. Our simulations below assume gasoline supply is perfectly elastic. As a consequence, ethanol subsidies do not change the equilibrium fuel price and therefore, provide no incentive for reduced fuel consumption.
14 See Table 2 . 15 Beginning in 1978 ethanol sales were exempt from federal fuel excise taxes. The VEETC, established in 2004, replaced this exemption with a 51 cent per gallon tax credit. The rate was lowered in 2008 to 45 cents per gallon. After several renewals, the VEETC was allowed to expire on December 31, 2011. 16 For examples see http://www.afdc.energy.gov/laws/state.
Innovation
Without new technologies for producing low-carbon fuels, reducing carbon emissions will be quite costly. Thus, one of the key features of any carbon policy will be how well it provides incentives for innovation. Overall, the importance of innovation is highlighted by the fact that the primary low-carbon fuels analyzed in this paper, cellulosic ethanols, are not currently produced on a commercial scale.
Innovation is an important area of public concern due to market failures associated with innovation. In order for innovation incentives to match the social gains from innovation, all the benefits would need to accrue to the innovator. Unfortunately this is rarely the case. First, innovation may result in lower prices. If these consumer surplus gains are not captured by the innovator, e.g., if the innovator cannot perfectly price discriminate, then innovation incentives can be too small. Second, knowledge is a public good. If an innovator discovers a process which reduces the costs of other firms, these spillover benefits would not accrue to the innovator and innovation incentives would be too small. Finally, innovation incentives can be too large if there is "business stealing" whereby the innovator merely receives profits which would have accrued to another firm without increasing social surplus. These market failures have led to substantial public involvement in innovation including the patent system, support for innovation through federal tax credits, and direct public investment in research, e.g., through the national laboratories.
We analyze three different types of innovation: new technologies, cost reducing innovation, and emissions reducing innovation. The new technologies we analyze are cellulosic ethanol from the various feedstocks. Currently, cellulosic ethanol is not produced at commercial scale and a suite of innovations will be required to produce cellulosic ethanol commercially. To analyze the benefits of the entire suite of innovations necessary to allow production of cellulosic ethanol, we simply compare the market equilibria with and without supply from the cellulosic ethanol feedstocks. Next, to analyze cost reducing innovation, we compare the market equilibria with and without a shift in the cellulosic supply curves (marginal cost curves). Our supply curves are based on engineers' projections for future technologies after years of research and development (R&D). Actual R&D could be less than expected leading to higher costs and emissions. To investigate gains from reducing costs, we analyze a counterfactual where cellulosic ethanol costs are 20 percent higher than our preferred supply curves. Finally, to analyze emissions reducing innovation, we compare the market equilibria with higher and lower carbon emissions rates, β i 's. Fuel carbon intensities might be reduced, for example, through use of new agricultural or production processes.
For each type of innovation and for the different carbon policies, we calculate several measures of gains. The first measure we calculate is the social surplus gain, which is found by simply comparing the social surplus with and without the innovation. The social surplus gain is the social willingness to pay for the innovation and is the benefit measure which would be used in a benefit-cost analysis of a policy which fostered the innovation. The second measures we calculate are the distributions of the gains across consumers, cellulosic ethanol producers, and corn ethanol producers. 17 The distribution of the gains tells whether the innovators' incentive is too weak, too strong, or exactly matches the social gains. The distribution of gains also tells whether we might expect groups to lobby for or against policies supporting that type of innovation. For example, if lowering the costs of cellulosic ethanol leads to large consumer surplus gains under a CAT, but not under the RFS, then we might expect consumers to be more supportive of cost reducing innovation under a CAT than under the RFS. Finally we calculate a measure of the marginal incentive to innovate by reducing costs or by improving emissions rates. This marginal incentive measures the gains a price-taking firm could expect from a marginal innovation under each of the policies. This marginal incentive can be compared to the social marginal incentive and may be too large or too small.
For innovation in emissions rates, we look at both marginal incentives and equilibrium effects under CAT and the LCFS. Because the RFS and subsidies do not explicitly consider carbon, there is no incentive for firms to reduce emissions under these policies. For the LCFS, marginal incentives for innovation in emissions rates can be too large or too small. To see this, consider the social planner's problem:
where, τ is the social cost of carbon. U (q i ) captures the benefits of consumption of fuel i. As before, β i is the emission rate of fuel i and C(q i ) are costs. By the envelope theorem, the efficient incentive for innovation in emissions rate is ∂L ∂β = τ q * i . Under CAT, Equation 6 implies the incentive to reduce the carbon emissions rate is λ CAT q i , again by the envelope theorem. If the carbon cap if set optimally, λ CAT = τ , the efficient incentive is obtained. Under the LCFS, the incentive to reduce the carbon emissions rate is λ LCF S q i , which can be too large or too small. 18 Using these results, we calculate producers' marginal incentives to improve emissions rates for each of the fuels in our simulation. 19 17 By construction, gasoline producers receive no rents. 18 See Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) for a further discussion of incentives under the LCFS. 19 Montero (2002) shows that pollution taxes and permits provide equal incentives for innovation when The marginal effects above represent producers private gains from reducing fuel carbon intensity. However if innovation reduces all firms' intensities, i.e. innovation is publicly provided, then we expect changes in emissions rates to affect prices and output. To see this, first consider the firm's constrained profit maximization problem under CAT. For exposition, we focus on one fuel i, such that:
where λ CAT is the price of a carbon permit under CAT. Taking the total derivative with respect to the emission rate β i and grouping terms yields:
The last term in Equation 10 is equal to the private incentive above (λ CAT q i ). The first term captures the change in profit from β i 's effect on output. The second term captures the marginal effects of β i on prices. Therefore, the overall effect of innovation on firm's profits depends not only λ CAT q i but also on how changes in β i affects quantities and prices.
Equations 11 and 12 are the analogous expressions for the LCFS. The firm's profit maximization problem for fuel i is:
Where λ LCF S is the price of a carbon permit under the LCFS. Taking the total derivative with respect to β i yields:
To explore gains and loses for public innovation in fuel emissions, Section 5.3 focus on counterfactuals where the emission rates of corn and cellulosic ethanol are 10 percentage points higher than our preferred estimates.
production. We construct county-level supply curves for corn ethanol and six different types of cellulosic ethanol. From these relationships we estimate county-level biomass consumption and land-use as well as aggregate carbon emissions and land-use related externalities. We simulate equilibrium outcomes under a business as usual scenario (BAU) and under a RFS, an LCFS, CAT, and direct subsidies (SUBS). We follow the approach in Holland et al. (2013) . Here, we briefly summarize the main assumptions and methods used in our analysis.
Supply curves
We construct supply curves for corn ethanol and six different cellulosic ethanol fuels produced from agricultural residues, forest waste, municipal solid waste, orchard and vineyard waste and herbaceous energy crops. The supply curves are based on engineering models for ethanol production costs and use detailed county-level data on agricultural production and waste resources. The industry is modeled as a set of profit-maximizing, price-taking firms with perfect information. See Parker (2011) and Parker (2012) for more details.
We begin by discussing the biomass resource data. County-level estimates for corn production are based on the aggregate relationship between corn prices and harvests. We forecast total US corn production based on projections from United States Department of Agriculture (2010). Each county's share of total production is proportional to its share of historical production as reported by National Agricultural Statistics Service (2009). Total corn ethanol production is constrained at 15 billion gallons per year in compliance with the RFS.
Biomass resources for cellulosic ethanol production are obtained from a variety of sources including energy crops and wastes. For energy crops, we focus on herbaceous energy crops (switchgrass) and farmed trees. We assume herbaceous energy crops may only be grown on marginal lands, defined as idle cropland or cropland used for pasture. Switchgrass resources are estimated by multiplying the amount of marginal land within a county, based on the 2007 Census of Agriculture (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009), by estimated switchgrass production yields from Wullschleger et al. (2010) . Farmed tree supply is based on recent US Forest Service estimates for pulpwood production. 20
We also consider orchard and vineyard waste and two types of agricultural residues: corn stover and wheat straw, that are by-products of grain production. Recently, agronomists have estimated the collection costs and availability of a variety of biomass resources based on historical yields, land areas, and production practices. Our wheat straw, orchard and vineyard resource estimates are from Nelson (2010) . The corn stover data are from Graham et al. (2007) . Finally, we consider the possibility of converting municipal solid waste to ethanol. We estimate the available resource using state-level per capita waste production statistics (Simmons et al., 2006) , the composition of wastes currently landfilled (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007), transportation, and waste sorting costs.
Ethanol production costs are based on engineering models for three technologies. Corn ethanol is produced by either wet-mill or dry-mill processes. Production costs for corn ethanol are taken from Gallagher, Brubaker, and Shapouri (2005) , , and Butzen and Hobbs (2002) . We assume all existing plants continue to operate and take their locations as fixed (Renewable Fuels Association, 2009 (2002); McAloon et al. (2000) . Because cellulosic ethanol technology is not currently at production scale, cost estimates are based on future projections and represent significant advances from the current state of the industry.
The model combines these data in a mixed integer linear programming model which maximizes firm profits by choosing plant location, production technology and output conditional on fuel price, biomass resources, conversion and transportation costs. Re-optimizing the model for a range of fuel prices yields county-level supply curve estimates for each fuel which we then aggregate to the national level. The resulting supply curves are shown in Figure 1 . Note that different prices correspond to different levels of plant production as well as different industry configurations in terms of the number, size and location of production facilities. Because these parameters are variable, the supply curves represent estimates of long-run biofuel supply.
GHG emissions intensities
Quantifying the emissions intensities of each fuel poses several challenges. First, because biofuels are produced from crops which remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, estimating emissions requires modeling the fuel "life-cycle" impacts from cultivation to production to combustion. Second, emissions impacts are more uncertain if one considers "indirect land-use effects" where increased cultivation of energy crops leads to new or displaced production on previously fallow lands. While indirect effects are controversial, recent work by Searchinger et al. (2008) ; California Air Resources Board (2009); Fargione et al. (2009); Hertel et al. (2010) ; Dumortier et al. (2011) suggests that large amounts of sequestered carbon may be released when new lands are put into production. Indirect emissions from corn and cellulosic ethanol production could add between 44% and 98% to the emissions intensities of these fuels (California Air Resources Board, 2009 ). Third, carbon emissions for cellulosic pathways may change as the industry matures.
Because of these challenges, there is no simple accounting of carbon intensities for the different ethanol fuels. Instead, we rely on estimates from life-cycle analyses. Table 1 summarizes estimates from recent studies. We present emissions rates normalized by the emissions intensity of gasoline. For example, an emissions intensity of 0.90 implies emissions 10 percent lower than gasoline. We see that there is substantial variation across the estimates. For ethanol produced from municipal solid waste, estimated emissions intensities range from 0.04 (Zhang, Joshi, and MacLean, 2010) to 0.35 (Kalogo et al., 2007) . For agricultural residues, estimates range from -0.29 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010) to 0.16 (Spatari, Zhang, and MacLean, 2007) . 21 Even in the case for the relatively more established corn ethanol production process, estimates vary substantially with intensities ranging from 0.79 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010), a 21 percent reduction in emissions, to 1.04 (California Air Resources Board, 2009), a 4 percent increase in emissions relative to gasoline.
Our approach in dealing with this uncertainty is twofold. First, our simulations assume emissions intensities for each fuel that fall conservatively in the range of those reported in the literature. We use 0.80 for corn based ethanol and 0.25 and 0.20 for ethanol produced from herbaceous energy crops and waste biomass. Then, in a series of robustness checks reported in Appendix B, we verify that our results do not depend on these assumptions.
Land use calculations
In our data, the feedstocks with the largest potential for large land-use shifts are corn and herbaceous energy crops. We assume that there are no land use effects associated with the use of waste biomass for ethanol production. 22 This assumption seems reasonable given collection costs and the relatively small quantity of waste biomass available.
Each ethanol supply curve is based on production at discrete plants optimally sited across the U.S. by our linear optimization model. The quantity of biomass required to produce a gallon of ethanol is determined by ethanol conversion efficiency factors assigned to each production technology described above. For each ethanol plant and each fuel type, the total quantity of biomass consumed is known for every point on the supply curve. To calculate the total amount of land required to supply biomass to each plant, we use county-level crop yield data to convert biomass tons to acres planted.
Corn yields are estimated by increasing the current county level yields (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009) uniformly at the rate projected for the national average (United States Department of Agriculture, 2010). Switchgrass yields were modeled by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for both lowland and upland varieties of switchgrass. To approximate yields for switchgrass grown on marginal lands, our calculations use upland yields. Pulpwood yields are from the US Forest Service.
We calculate both the total area used in energy crop production and the "land-use intensity" under each policy. We define land use intensity as the total number of acres used in energy crop production divided by total land area in a given county. This approach provides a consistent basis for comparison across counties and highlights the regions where land use shifts are occurring. Using total land area as the basis for comparison also illustrates the tradeoffs that occur when marginal lands are put into production. 23 We calculate land areas and intensities for all energy crops, corn plus switchgrass and farmed trees, and for corn alone. This distinction is useful for two reasons. First, farmland used for corn production is a substitute for land used for food crops. Herbaceous energy crops and pulpwood are assumed to be grown on land not used for production of food or other cultivated crops. Therefore, one would expect food price and indirect land use effects from corn to be larger than for crops grown on marginal land. Second, corn may be raised using more intensive farming practices leading to more fertilizer use, irrigation, erosion, etc., compared to herbaceous crops and trees. Below we show both the changes in land areas for each crop category as well the the geographic distribution of energy crop intensity.
Simulating transportation carbon policies
We simulate long-run equilibrium outcomes under each of the different carbon policies and in a business as usual scenario with no carbon policy. Ethanol production is characterized by our seven supply curves. We model long-run gasoline supply as perfectly elastic at a price of $2.75 per gallon. 24 This assumption seems reasonable given that the carbon policies reduce gasoline production, suggesting refinery capacity constraints are unlikely to be a factor in the long-run. However, this assumption would be violated if long-run average costs are upward sloping, for instance due to heterogeneity in refineries' access to inputs or demand. Total fuel demand is modeled as constant elasticity, with an elasticity of 0.5 and calibrated to US EIA projected fuel consumption of 140 billion gge per year at our baseline price of $2.75 per gge. 25 We assume the fuels are perfect substitutes after taking into account the volumetric energy densities of gasoline and ethanol.
For each of the policies described in Section 2 and the BAU scenario we calculate the equilibrium consumer and producer prices that equate supply and demand. Under BAU, the equilibrium price is determined by the long-run supply of gasoline at $2.75. For the RFS, we calculate the producer prices that satisfy the three different RFS constraints and equate total fuel supply and demand. We design the LCFS and CAT policies to achieve the same total reduction in carbon emissions as the RFS. Specifically, the LCFS producer price vector includes a carbon price that reflects the emissions intensity of each fuel and the intensity target. We adjust the intensity target until overall carbon emissions match the RFS. Under CAT, we simply set the carbon cap at the RFS level. For ethanol subsidies, the consumer price is the marginal cost of gasoline. Producer prices for ethanol are adjusted by the subsidy amounts. We use the recent VEETC ($0.45 per gallon) and cellulosic ($1.01 per gallon) subsidy levels rather than targeting the same emissions reduction as the RFS.
Because our ethanol supply curves are discontinuous, we solve for equilibrium under each policy using a numerical simulation algorithm. In the BAU case, ethanol production is determined by price and the ethanol supply curves. Gasoline production is the amount of additional fuel required to clear the market. Under the RFS, the simulation consists of two separate search algorithms. The first set determines the RFS ratios that satisfy the three volumetric mandates. The second set calculates the RIN prices that satisfy the RFS ratios for each fuel. Gasoline production again fills the residual demand. The LCFS simulation loops over the LCFS shadow price λ LCF S until the LCFS constraint is satisfied. On outer loop solves for the LCFS constraint the matches carbon emissions to the RFS level. For CAT, the carbon price is adjusted until total emissions equal the cap, where again the cap equals emissions under the RFS.
Results
We begin by comparing prices, emissions and ethanol production under each policy. Next, we compare land use changes and investigate the distribution of energy crop production across counties. Because we have information on the type of land used, we also report this separately for cultivated and uncultivated lands. Given prior estimates of costs associated with land use changes, we calculate what these changes imply for non-GHG externalities. We also report land use externalities on a per GHG-abated basis allowing the reader to compare these costs with estimates of the social cost of carbon. We investigate the robustness of each policy to errors in assigning carbon emission intensities to each fuel, and quantify the cost of any uncontrolled carbon emissions. Finally, we calculate incentives for innovation. Table 2 shows energy prices, fuel production, and emissions under each policy. The 2022 RFS leads to a 10.2 percent reduction in carbon emissions compared with BAU. By design, the LCFS and CAT systems achieve the same reduction. However, the reduction mechanisms differ across policies. Energy prices are substantially higher under CAT at $3.23 per gge. Because demand is downward sloping, higher prices imply less fuel is consumed under CAT, 129.1 billion gge, compared to the other policies, 135 to 140 billion gge. This means with CAT, less ethanol is required to achieve the same reduction in emissions. Across policies, we see ethanol quantity increases by 3.8 billion gge under CAT compared with 14.9 to 18.5 billion under the alternatives. 26, 27 Greater substitution to ethanol under the alternatives to CAT creates inefficiency in terms of higher abatement costs. To see this, Figure 2 shows marginal abatement costs and emissions reduction mechanisms for CAT and a LCFS when we vary abatement levels. The heavy black line shows the marginal abatement cost under each policy calculated by running our simulation model for range of carbon prices and determining the level of carbon emissions. The light line depicts marginal abatement costs assuming zero fuel substitution. 28 For a 10.2% reduction in emissions, the marginal abatement costs under CAT and the LCFS are $40.83 per MTCO 2 e and $189.70 per MTCO 2 e, respectively. Under CAT, a substantially larger portion of the emissions reduction comes from reduced fuel demand. Under the LCFS, 26 Under CAT, these quantities correspond to an effective blend of 10 percent ethanol by volume (E10). Under the alternatives, blends range from E21 to E24. We assume that producers in 2022 are not constrained by the current "blend wall" limiting fuel to a maximum ethanol content of 10 percent.
27 These large shifts in fuel production translate into large changes in resource consumption. We summarize biomass feedstock consumption under the different policies in Appendix A. 28 We calculate this curve by assuming ethanol has the same emissions intensity as gasoline. In this case, carbon reductions come only from reductions in fuel consumption due to increased fuel prices and the elasticity of fuel demand. a much larger share of abatement comes from fuel substitution, i.e. the horizontal distance between the light and heavy curves in Figure 2 . This finding highlights the main difference between CAT and the other policies under consideration, namely that emissions reductions under CAT come from reduced fuel consumption while direct subsidies, the RFS and LCFS result in more substitution towards ethanol.
Production of the different types of ethanol also varies considerably across policies. Under the RFS and subsidies, corn ethanol production increases by 8 to 9 billion gge per year relative to BAU. Under the LCFS, the increase is roughly half as much. Under CAT, no additional corn ethanol is produced. The RFS, LCFS, and subsidy policies all result in large increases in cellulosic ethanol production from energy crops and waste feedstocks. Under CAT, the majority of new ethanol production comes from waste resources. Overall, the large increases in ethanol production from energy crops suggests large shifts in agricultural activity and land-use under the alternatives to CAT.
Land-Use Changes
Land intensities for energy crops are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 3 shows intensities for all energy crops, i.e corn, switchgrass and pulpwood, under the 2022 RFS, LCFS, CAT and subsidies. Energy crop production under CAT is modest and concentrated primarily in the Midwest. In stark contrast, the LCFS and RFS result in substantial amounts of land dedicated to energy crop production. Intensities under direct subsidies are quite similar to the RFS, though the emissions reduction is considerable smaller. Figure 4 shows land intensities for corn under each policy. Effects under the RFS are large with many Midwest counties devoting large land fractions to corn production. The LCFS also results in large increases in corn production. In contrast, the CAT system leads to relatively small changes in corn land intensity. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of county-level land-use intensity across policies. In constructing each distribution we eliminate counties that never produce energy crops by dropping those regions with zero energy crop production at a fuel price of $6.13 per gge. 29 The maximum land intensity ranges from 51 percent to 62 percent depending on the policy. Under the RFS, this means that in one county 62 percent of the total land area is used for the production of energy crops. Five percent of counties devote over 26 percent of land area to corn ethanol production and 10 percent of counties use over 12 percent. In contrast, under CAT less than 5 percent of crop producing counties have any meaningful energy crop acreage. Under subsidies, the trends are similar with intensities of 9.3 percent and 25.4 percent at the 90th and 95th percentiles, respectively. Under the LCFS, intensities are somewhat less, but still substantial, with intensities in 5 percent of counties greater than 14.4 percent.
These high intensities lead to large changes in acreage for energy crop production. Table  4 summarizes total land-use changes, relative to BAU, under each policy. Under CAT, total changes in land-use are modest. Area for energy crops increases 1.2 million acres relative to BAU. There is essentially zero increase in corn acreage. Land-use changes under the LCFS are larger with approximately 14.7 million additional corn acres and 27.6 more total acres relative to BAU. The effects are largest under the RFS which results in 39.0 million additional acres of energy crop production. Approximately 27.7 million additional acres are used for corn production. 30 Under subsidies, the land use changes are quite similar at 37.7 million addition total acres and 25.7 additional corn acres relative to BAU. To put these numbers in perspective, the total increase in agricultural production under the RFS would occupy and area equal to approximately 9 percent of total US agricultural land (Lubowski et al. (2006) ). If this land were a state, it would be ranked the 24th largest in size ahead of Georgia, Illinois, Iowa and New York.
To understand the environmental costs associated with these large land shifts, we rely on the results of previous studies. Because it is difficult to obtain estimates for the wide range of environmental effects that may occur, we focus on erosion and habitat loss. Hansen (2007) estimates imply costs from erosion and habitat loss between $36 and $80 per acre. For corn, we assume each new acre of production increases total US agricultural land by .3 acres. 31 Based on these studies, we use a range of land-related environmental costs between $10 and $25 per additional acre of corn production. We conservatively assume that production of herbaceous energy crops and pulpwood have no net environmental impact. 32 Additional information on the calculation of these costs is discussed in the Appendix. Finally, we convert costs to dollars per ton of CO 2 e in order to compare with estimates of the social cost of carbon. 30 Our estimates for the land-use effects of the RFS fall in the range of other recent estimates. Chen et al. (2011) find the 2022 RFS increases total acres by 16.95 million and corn acres by 11.47 million. Chakravorty et al. (2013) find the RFS increases US land used for energy crop production by 148 million acres. However, there is no net increase in total cultivated land due to offsetting increases in food production elsewhere. 32 Our supply curves assume switchgrass is grown on marginal lands without irrigation of chemical fertilizers. Further, we assume production does not substantially increase erosion and switchgrass offers similar wildlife habitat to the land being replaced. Table 5 summarizes costs due to non-carbon externalities stemming from changes in corn production under the various policies. The differences in costs across policies are significant. Under CAT, land use change costs are approximately zero. Under the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies systems, costs range between $147 and $277 million for the low cost scenario and $368 and $693 million for the high cost scenario. Per ton of carbon abatement, these costs fall between $0.89 and $2.31 per MTCO 2 e for the low cost scenario and between $2.22 and $5.77 per MTCO 2 e for the high cost scenario. To put these effects in perspective, under the RFS and subsidies, social costs due to land use changes amount to between 6 percent and 16 percent of the social cost of carbon. 33 Under the LCFS, these costs are between 3 percent and 8 percent of the social cost of carbon.
Uncontrolled emissions
As discussed previously, the life-cycle emissions of advanced ethanol production technologies are highly uncertain. Carbon emissions associated with direct and indirect land use changes resulting from shifts in agriculture are also uncertain (Dumortier et al., 2011; Keeney and Hertel, 2009 ). This creates the possibility of errors in estimating the carbon intensities of different ethanol pathways. Furthermore, emissions intensities under any transportation sector carbon policy are likely to be set as part of a political process. In light of this, we investigate the sensitivity of actual emissions under each policy to errors in the emissions intensity.
We focus on emissions related to corn ethanol production and associated land use changes. Imagine a scenario where the emissions intensity of corn ethanol is 10 percentage points larger than expected. Specifically, assume the true value of σ corn = 0.90 compared to the baseline value of σ corn = 0.80. 34 Higher emissions could be thought of as higher than expected, but unmeasured, indirect land use effects. 35 We then re-calculate emissions to understand whether the effect of this "error" varies across policies. Table 6 summarizes carbon emissions under each scenario. We use the term "uncontrolled" emissions to describe the additional carbon emitted because the true emissions in-33 Assuming a value of $26.3 per MTCO 2 e per Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2011) for 2020 with a 3 percent discount rate.
34 For simplicity we imagine an error which underestimates emissions. From a welfare perspective, an overestimate could also be costly if it resulted in a level of ethanol production that was inefficiently too low. However, given the existence of other negative externalities associated with land use changes, the welfare implications are likely to be asymmetric. 35 Alternatively, the higher emission rate could represent true emissions when the rate used for compliance is set artificially low by the policy process. tensity is larger than the emissions intensity specified by policy makers. An intuitive metric of environmental effectiveness is the quantity of uncontrolled emissions as a fraction of the stated reduction in carbon. The effect of the higher emissions intensity is smallest under CAT at approximately 0.7 percent. Under the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies the effects are 7.1 percent, 4.0 percent, and 9.9 percent, respectively.
These effects are economically significant. We estimate the additional carbon damages due to uncontrolled emissions by adopting the central estimate of the Greenstone, Kopits, and Wolverton (2011) . At a carbon cost of $26.3 per MTCO 2 e, damages due to uncontrolled emissions range from approximately $30 million per year under CAT to over $307.7 million per year under the RFS. As this example illustrates, errors or biases in the true greenhouse gas content of biofuels are magnified under the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies, compared with CAT.
Gains from innovation
We now consider gains from innovation under each policy. As discussed in Section 3 we consider both public and privately provided innovation that leads to the development of cellulosic ethanol, reductions in fuel costs or emissions. We begin with gains from the development of cellulosic ethanol. Table 7 shows surplus with and without the six types of cellulosic ethanol under BAU, LCFS, CAT, and subsidies. We cannot analyze the RFS since the RFS explicitly requires production of cellulosic ethanol. As before, we design the LCFS and CAT such that they each result in the same carbon emissions as the RFS baseline. The first column of Table 7 shows the benefits from innovation with no carbon policy are $0.91 billion. This benefit comes from cellulosic ethanol that would be produced even in the absence of carbon policy. Note that the entire benefit accrues to the producers of cellulosic ethanol since the additional ethanol simply displaces gasoline and does not lower the price of fuel. In this case, private innovation incentives exactly match the social incentives.
With a carbon policy the story is quite different. For the LCFS, the fuel price would need to rise to $3.48 to reduce carbon sufficiently in the absence of innovation. However, with innovation in cellulosic ethanol, the fuel price would only rise to $2.96. Thus consumers as well as cellulosic ethanol producers benefit from innovation. However, corn ethanol producers are harmed by innovation under the LCFS. Recall that the LCFS has an implicit subsidy to fuels with relatively low carbon intensities. In the absence of innovation in cellulosic ethanol, corn ethanol is the low carbon fuel and as such receives a subsidy. Corn ethanol loses this subsidy when cellulosic ethanol is commercialized. 36
The gains from innovation to cellulosic ethanol producers under the LCFS are quite substantial, approximately $20.56 billion. Note that this implies that cellulosic ethanol producers would be willing to pay (e.g., in licensing fees) more than the entire social benefit from innovation ($2.61 billion). Thus the private innovation incentives under the LCFS are too large and could result in investment beyond the socially efficient level. 37
The social benefits from innovation are largest, $4.38 billion, under CAT. Since with innovation the fuel price does not need to increase as much, consumers also benefit. However, much of the increase in consumer surplus is offset by a loss in carbon market revenue (which drops from $102 billion to $59 billion). Even if we assume producers receive none of the carbon market revenue, cellulosic ethanol producers capture nearly all of the social benefits of innovation. Producer surplus to corn ethanol producers decreases with innovation due to lower fuel prices. Thus the private incentive to innovate for cellulosic ethanol producers may be too small, but the gap between the private and socially efficient incentives is relatively small. Under subsidies, the benefits from innovation accrue entirely to the producers of cellulosic ethanol. 38 Subsidies provide quite a strong private incentive for innovation, but it would be cheaper to give the cellulosic ethanol producers the $17.29 billion directly since the subsidy payments exceed this amount by $4.45 billion. Finally, the development of cellulosic ethanol lowers costs of carbon reductions under the LCFS, CAT, and subsidies. We define average abatement cost as the total change in private surplus, net of carbon market revenues or subsidy payments, divided by carbon abatement. Next, we consider gains from a reduction ethanol costs. Table 8 presents the counterfactual where cellulosic ethanol costs are 20 percent higher than our preferred supply curves. Because all producers realize the same percentage costs reductions from innovation, this can be thought of as publicly provided innovation. 39 As before, comparing counterfactual surplus with our base estimates illustrates gains from innovation. The social benefits from lowering costs by 20 percent are substantial, between $2.58 and $7.03 billion per year. This suggests 36 Note that corn ethanol producers gain under the LCFS even with innovation they just don't gain as much as they would have in the absence of innovation.
37 This result is akin to the business-stealing effect which can lead to excess entry beyond the socially optimal level of entry.
38 This comes from our assumption of perfectly elastic gasoline supply. 39 If a firm appropriated all the gains from innovation, the marginal private incentive for reducing the cost to produce fuel i would be q i , which is larger under the RFS, LCFS and subsidies compared with CAT. costs reductions are important areas of innovation beyond the initial development advanced ethanol. Innovation lowers average abatement costs under each policy between $10.74 and $29.94 per MTCO 2 e. There are large private gains for cellulosic ethanol producers under the LCFS and CAT of $3.18 billion and $1.91 billion, respectively. In both cases, social benefits exceed producer surplus increases. Under subsidies, private surplus gains to cellulosic producers are $6.39 billion, and substantially larger than social surplus increases of $3.91 billion. This again suggests private incentives for innovation are too large. Interestingly, if all firms realize the same cost reductions, there is no private incentive for innovation under the RFS. Instead, loses from innovation to cellulosic producers are approximately $2.97 billion. Reduced cellulosic costs lowers the implicit subsidy required to achieve the RFS mandate. As a result, producer surplus from cellulosic ethanol decreases. 40 This surprising result suggests that while the RFS provides a large incentive for the development of cellulosic fuels ($20.56 billion), producers may be worse off with public R&D that lowers cellulosic costs.
Finally, we investigate innovation in fuel emission intensities. We consider both the marginal private incentives for improving fuel emissions rates and gains from public innovation that leads to cleaner ethanol. Beginning with the marginal incentives, Table 9 shows firms private incentives for reducing fuel emission intensities. As before, we base these calculations on CAT and LCFS systems that yield the same level of emissions as the RFS. Incentives are largest for gasoline, due to the larger market share relative to ethanol. Under the CAT, the annual incentive to reduce the carbon intensity is approximately $4.9 million per gCO 2 e/gge. For corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol made from herbaceous energy crops and waste feedstocks, the incentives are between $20 and $300 thousand per gCO 2 e/gge. Compare these values to the marginal incentives under the LCFS, which are an order of magnitude larger. The marginal incentive for innovation is $21.1 million per gCO 2 e/gge for gasoline. For corn and cellulosic ethanol the incentives are between $880 thousand and $1.9 million per gCO 2 e/gge. Under CAT, the price of a carbon permit is $40.83 per MTCO 2 e. If the SCC is less than this level, both the LCFS and CAT systems will provide marginal incentives for innovation that are too large. However, since the marginal incentives for innovation are larger for an LCFS that produces the same reduction in emissions, they will also be too large at an abatement level where the CAT incentives are optimal. Of course, larger gains to ethanol producers under the LCFS or subsidies may help offset other market failures such as innovation spillovers. Because the magnitude of innovation spillovers in ethanol production is unknown, it is impossible to say whether these incentives are too large or too small. In general, it is unlikely that these policies will provide the correct incentives, and targeting spillovers directly with R&D subsidies or strengthened intellectual property seems preferable.
To investigate the distributional effects of public innovation, we compare surplus changes in two scenarios. The first two columns of Table 10 show a counterfactual where the emission rate of corn ethanol is 10 percentage points higher than our preferred estimates. The second two columns use a counterfactual where cellulosic emissions are 10 percentage points higher than our preferred estimates. Overall, the effects of innovation are more modest than in the other scenarios. Under CAT, producers of corn ethanol gain $50 million per year if the corn emission rate is lowered by 10 percentage points. Cellulosic ethanol producers gain $130 million if cellulosic emissions are lowered the same amount. In both cases, private gains exceed the social benefits from reducing cellulosic emissions. Under the LCFS, corn ethanol producers gain $640 million from reducing emissions intensities 10 percentage points. However, loses to cellulosic producers are approximately $5.27 billion. Lower corn emissions increases corn ethanol production from 1 billion gge per year to 5.6 billion gge per year. Cellulosic ethanol production decreases slightly and receives a smaller implicit subsidy. Overall, this means that reducing corn ethanol emissions under the LCFS lowers social surplus by $610 million. For cellulosic ethanol, lowering emissions intensities decreases producer surplus for both corn ethanol and cellulosic producers. This comes from the equilibrium effects of decreasing β i on prices and quantities. Cleaner cellulosic fuel decreases the implicit subsidy received by producers and reduces the amount of cellulosic ethanol required to meet the standard. While the social benefits from innovation are positive, in this case the LCFS provides no private incentive for reducing cellulosic carbon intensity.
Discussion
There are a number of options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels. If substitution towards ethanol is a major outcome of US policy, then a number of additional social costs beyond carbon merit consideration. Intuitively, polices that result in larger shifts in ethanol production will yield larger land-use and indirect emissions effects. Here, we show these effects can be quite large. For example, costs related to erosion and habitat loss are $277 to $693 million larger under the RFS compared to CAT. Similarly, costs from uncontrolled emissions can be large. For relatively small errors in emissions intensities, 10 percentage points in our example, costs due to uncontrolled emissions are nearly $150 million greater under the LCFS compared to CAT. 41 Proponents of transportation carbon policies often use innovation incentives as justification for these policies. We find incentives for innovation in ethanol can be too large or too small. For the development of cellulosic ethanol, the incentives are too large under the LCFS and subsides, with private gains to producers exceeding the total social benefits of innovation. However, the social benefits from incremental cost reductions once cellulosic is developed are large, and exceed producers' gains under every policy except subsidies. Interestingly, if all producers achieve similar cost reductions, there are no producer gains under the RFS. In terms of emissions, marginal incentives to reduce fuel carbon intensities are several times larger under the LCFS compared with CAT. This suggests the LCFS could lead to too much innovation. Taking into account equilibrium effects on quantities and prices, the LCFS may or may not provide private incentive for innovation in emissions.
Overall, there are many challenges to policies such as the RFS, LCFS or ethanol subsidies. While several authors have highlighted desirable features of these approaches in a second-best setting (de Gorter and Just, 2010; Holland, 2012; Lapan and Moschini, 2012) , a combination of first-best instruments is preferable. In terms of carbon abatement, there is growing evidence that the alternatives to CAT are quite costly. 42 Given the additional costs we estimate here, one must further question the wisdom of policies such as the RFS, LCFS and subsidies. 41 As discussed previously, 10 percentage points is well-within the range of uncertainly for estimates of corn ethanol emissions rates.
42 For example, Holland et al. (2013) find average abatement costs of carbon are 2.5 to 4 times higher under the RFS, LCFS and subsidies compared with CAT. In terms of cellulosic feedstocks, herbaceous energy crops represent a large share of feedstock consumption under the RFS, LCFS, and subsidies policies. Agricultural residues, municipal waste and other waste feedstocks contribute between 143 and 213 million tons annually to ethanol production. However, under the RFS and subsidy policies, wastes represent less than half of total biomass consumed. Under the LCFS, the waste share of total tons is approximately 55 percent. Under CAT, approximately 87 percent of total tons come from waste. This suggests that while wastes are important biofuel feedstocks, the alternatives to CAT will also require high levels of energy crop production.
B Robustness
We investigate the robustness of our results along several dimensions. Specifically, we explore our assumptions about baseline fuel prices, emissions intensities and demand elasticities. In addition, we allow corn prices and therefore our corn ethanol supply curve to vary based on changes in corn consumption. We begin with the fuel price scenarios.
Our preferred results assume a baseline fuel price of $2.75 per gallon. Given our assumption of perfectly elastic gasoline supply, higher (lower) baseline fuel prices imply more (less) ethanol is produced under BAU. Therefore, land-use changes under each policy also depend on this assumption. We rerun our simulations for two alternate baseline prices, $2.25 per gge and $3.25 per gge. Results for these cases are presented alongside our preferred results in Appendix Table 2 . At the lower price, less switchgrass is produced resulting in fewer acres devoted to energy crop production under BAU. At the higher price, substantially more acreage is devoted to corn production under BAU. Higher prices move production onto the elastic portion of the corn ethanol supply curve resulting in a large increase in land use, compared with our main results. That said, looking across the policies, the RFS, LCFS and SUBS each still result in large additional increases in acreage. Under CAT, though the change in acreage is higher at $3.25 baseline price, the increase relative to BAU is still quite small compared to the other policies.
Next, we investigate the robustness of our results to different emissions intensities. Appendix Table 3 shows our preferred emissions parameters as well as several alternate scenarios. The "High-Indirect Land Use" scenario assumes the indirect emissions of expanding energy crop production are larger than expected. We increase the corn and herbaceous energy crop intensities to 1.00 and 0.40, respectively. The "Waste-Zero" scenario assumes ethanol from waste biomass results in zero net carbon emissions. Finally, the "Existing Corn" scenario assumes new corn ethanol plants have emissions profiles similar to current technology plants. 44 We use 0.90 for corn ethanol, but leave the other parameters at their base levels. We re-run our simulation model under each of these scenarios. Results of this exercise are presented in Appendix Table 4 . Changing emissions parameters has no effect on land use in the BAU case or under the RFS or SUBS because these policies don't explicitly consider the carbon emissions of fuels. 45 Under the LCFS and CAT, scenarios with higher corn emissions make corn ethanol a less attractive substitute for gasoline. This results in smaller land use shifts under the LCFS relative to BAU. However, land-use changes under CAT are still substantially less than under the LCFS.
Appendix Table 5 presents simulation results for different price elasticities of gasoline demand. Our preferred simulations use a price elasticity of -0.50. Here, we simulate less elastic and more elastic demand assuming elasticities of -0.30 and -0.70. The land-use change estimates are very similar to our base results. Because we update the RFS ratios to meet the overall quantity mandates, the RFS estimates are identical across the three elasticity scenarios. Under subsidies, our assumption of perfectly elastic gasoline implies fuel prices do not change, and varying the demand elasticity does not affect fuel consumption. For the LCFS and CAT policies, more elastic demand means less ethanol is required to meet a given carbon reduction. 46 This reduces land-use changes relative to BAU, though, this effect is quite small.
Our corn ethanol supply curves take corn price as fixed. Corn represents a substantial fraction of the cost of producing corn ethanol, in our simulations approximately $2.00 per gasoline gallon equivalent. We set corn prices under the 2022 RFS to $3.64 per bushel, consistent with production of 10 billion gge per year of corn ethanol (United States Department of Agriculture, 2010). This approach is reasonable for evaluating the land-use effects of the RFS. However, substantially less corn ethanol is produced under BAU and CAT, which may lower corn prices. To gauge the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we use an elasticity of corn prices with respect to corn consumption of 0.12 (Gardner, 2007) to adjust our supply curve for corn price effects. We then re-run our simulation model using the adjusted supply curve. Appendix Table 6 shows the results of this exercise. Lower marginal costs for modest levels of corn ethanol production (compared with the RFS) mean that more corn acreage is used for the LCFS, CAT and SUBS, relative to our base case. However, these effects are again small and the relative differences in land-use across policies remains large.
C Environmental costs per acre of cropland
Land-use changes have important implications for indirect carbon emissions, food prices, run-off, erosion and habitat loss. Because different transportation carbon policies are likely to result in vastly different land-use changes, we consider these costs an important part of any policy evaluation. We incorporate indirect carbon emissions directly in our baseline emissions intensity parameters. However, increased ethanol production may result in other land-use related externalities such as erosion or habitat loss.
One of the potential benefits of herbaceous energy crops, such as switchgrass, are the low environmental costs of cultivation. Our supply curves assume switchgrass is grown on marginal agricultural lands without irrigation or application of chemical fertilizers. We imagine that these farming practices do not substantially increase, and potentially reduce, erosion. Furthermore, we assume that when land is converted to switchgrass farming, these fields offer similar wildlife habitat to the fallow land being replaced. Under these circumstances, we conservatively estimate the environmental costs of additional lands devoted to herbaceous energy crop production as zero. Similarly, we assume farmed trees do not result in additional environmental costs per acre.
Cultivated crops such as corn on the other hand may have more serious environmental costs. Land used for increased corn production comes from a combination of existing agricultural land previously used for other cultivated crops, and new lands being brought into production. To a first approximation, we assume the environmental costs of corn and other cultivated crops are similar. Therefore, we ignore the fraction of land coming from crop substitution. To model new lands, we assume any additional acres come from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). Hansen (2007) , studies the benefits of CRP in terms of reduced erosion and habitat preservation. He estimates an annual benefit of approximately $1.3 billion for the approximately 36 million acres in CRP for an average annual benefit of approximately $36 per acre per year. Benefits vary substantially by region. In the nation's corn belt, Hansen (2007) estimates CRP benefits of over $80 per acre. We use $36 per acre and $80 per acre as lower and upper bounds on the range of potential costs.
To estimate the fraction of new acres per additional acre of corn produced we refer to previous work on land use changes from biofuel production. Searchinger et al. (2008) model global land-use changes under the Federal RFS. The authors find that a 56 billion liter (15 billion gallon) increase in U.S. corn ethanol production, increases corn acreage by 7.9 million hectares (19.5 million acres). Total cropland increases by 2.2 million hectares (29%). Hertel et al. (2010) find increased ethanol production requires an additional 6 million hectares (14.8 million acres) of coarse grain production with an increase of 1.6 million hectares (27%) overall. Therefore, we assume that each additional corn acre increases total US agricultural acreage by 0.3 acres. Based on these assumptions, we use a range of environmental costs from land-use change between $10 and $25 per additional acre of corn production. Notes: For the RFS, LCFS, CAT and SUBS policies a "+" indicates an increase in acreage relative to BAU. Land areas are measured in 1000s of acres. Notes: For the RFS, LCFS, CAT and SUBS policies a "+" indicates an increase in acreage relative to BAU. Land areas are measured in 1000s of acres.
